Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 43
Issue 6 Issue 6 - Symposium: Law, Literature,
and Social Change

Article 6

11-1990

Social Violence and Political Representation
Michael Ryan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Ryan, Social Violence and Political Representation, 43 Vanderbilt Law Review 1771 (1990)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol43/iss6/6

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Social Violence and Political
Representation
Michael Ryan*

I.

II.
III.
IV.

PREFACE ...............................................
INTRODUCTION .........................................
REPRESENTATION AND VIOLENCE ........................
FOR CONSTITUENCY DEMOCRACY .........................
REPRESENTATION AS AN ANTIDOTE TO VIOLENCE.........
AFTERWORD ............................................

1771

1772
1773
1778
1783

1784

PREFACE

There once was a law school. Of its sixty faculty members, twenty
were white male heterosexuals, twenty were white women, and twenty
were black. The white men had by some freak of history acquired a
great deal of power in the law school. To them went all the privileges,
from the best offices and courses, to exclusive use of the library and
high salaries. A committee of three such white men governed the law
school. One was a liberal, one a conservative, and the other a reactionary. The women and the blacks lived an academic version of poverty
and disempowerment-no photocopying privileges, no library rights,
ten times more courses to teach, low salaries, and no say in the governance of the school. Good students shunned them because their recommendations were worthless. Less stellar students needed their help
because they themselves were shunned by the white men, but the
blacks and women had no time to give them-they were so overworked.
At a certain point, the forty blacks and women decided to take
their case to the school's governing committee. They submitted a list of
grievances and demands; they asked for basic changes, even a little bit
of equality in the distribution of power and resources. The reactionary
member of the committee would not talk to them. The conservative
said that he was encouraged by their ability to recognize the virtues of
the system within which they worked, its capacity to be elastic and to
accommodate the need for change. He praised their activism and urged
them to continue on their course. But . ..
*
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"But," he said, "we cannot really satisfy your demands. Things just
will not change. The basic structures are what they are. I am sorry."
The liberal wondered at their inability to recognize the virtues of
the system within which they worked. "We have a genuinely free law
school here," he said, "one in which dissent is permitted. But I cannot
help you, for I fear what might happen if too much fragmentation resulted from your demands. We have harmony now. Moreover, I have
heard that our friend and colleague, the reactionary, is planning a coup
if we give in to your wishes. Think of what that might mean; not only
would you have no rights, but ours would be taken away as well."
Frustrated and angry, the women and blacks took over the committee meeting, ejected the three sitting members, and named three new
members-one white male, one black, and one woman. This seemed to
them more fair, since there were forty women and blacks, and only
twenty white males. The new committee immediately voted to rescind
the exclusive privileges of the white men, to equalize the distribution of
work, and to reallocate the school's resources along strictly equitable
lines.
At first, the white men were unhappy with this, but they soon got
used to it.
I.

INTRODUCTION

If I were to sum up the revolution that has occurred in the humanities (and increasingly in the social sciences) in the past two decades, it
would be to say that what was before seen as substance is now seen as
representation. One could expand on that statement in several ways:
what was before seen as nature or reason is now seen as convention or
artifact; what was before a logic of necessity is now a highly contingent,
even random relation of terms whose connections obey no necessary order; what was before a ground or foundation from which reasonable derivatives could be deduced and applied to different situations is now
itself the effect of contextual situations and systems of signification;
what was before rationalist axiomatics is now rhetorical agonistics. At
stake here, of course, is a very old battle; we have been hearing about it
for at least 2500 years, ever since people first began to feel the need for
written laws and interpreters, philosophers and judges. With those developments came a sense that the terms in which social order-and
with it, as always, social power-would be defined somehow had a bearing on the terms in which that world would be represented in the dominant forms of social knowledge. From the start, how we represented the
world to ourselves had something to do with how we came together in
societies, how we forced other people to do our labor for us, how we
dealt with those who disagreed with our particular conception of what
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it meant to be part of our society. If a certain difference in representation would always have something to do with social change, the elevation to dominance of certain very powerful representations would also
always have something to do with how societies immunized themselves
against social change.
In this Article I will suggest some ways in which the philosophical
revolution of recent decades, which is usually associated with post
words like poststructuralism and postmodernism, might help us think
about the way societies are held in place by regimes of representation. I
am particularly interested in how this revolution allows us to imagine
new ways of formulating and constructing the societies in which we live.
I will discuss first the relationship between power, representation, and
violence. I will then suggest some ways in which representation can be a
lever for undoing the power that is so important for the maintenance of
a violent and unequal distribution of resources and responsibilities
under western capitalism.

II.

REPRESENTATION AND VIOLENCE

That dominant forms of social knowledge have something to do
with the maintenance of social power is not a new insight. I would like
to suggest a strong relationship between the forms of representation
that shape social knowledge and the forms of representation that give
structure to our political institutions, especially inasmuch as those institutions are usually thought to embody ideals of fair and equal representation in a liberal democracy.
By representation I mean such things as image, word, sign, symbol,
and story. A representation stands in for something else, allowing invisible ideas to become concrete things or permitting an encapsulation of
something large or long in a brief and communicable form. Our
thoughts are represented in words, our desires in actions, our ideals in
institutions, and our fears in the images we project onto others.-The
principal mechanism of representation is substitution, but representation also encompasses displacement, negation, inversion, encapsulation,
spatialization, and the like.
In the postmodern age, three things that have been noticed regarding representation are important to my concerns here: Its variability, its
active power, and its capacity to invert cause and effect. Representations vary, even representations of the same thing. Black people seen
(cognitively represented) from the perspective of a white racist will appear (be represented as) frightening, huge, evil, threatening. A white
liberal will picture (represent) them as needing white patronage in order to succeed. A conservative will see (represent) them as being lazy
welfare thieves. Blacks themselves might represent African-American
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life in differing ways, depending on their social position, religious assumptions, and personal history. The variety of representations is itself
representative of material differences of station and enculturation.
Representations signify and produce different kinds of attitudes
and actions. They have an active power: they make things happen, usually by painting the world in such a way that certain policies-from
domestic slavery to Cold War militarism-will appear justified. More
importantly, perhaps, the very act of painting itself enacts the policy.
The mapping out of a social terrain as an exploitable field of economic
possibilities already in effect transforms that terrain, denying other possibilities and producing an object that can be acted on without certain
constraints which might have come into play if the social world had
been conceived (pictured, mapped, represented) differently.
This is particularly clear when representations, which are supposedly the effects of the things they represent, come to take the place of
their cause, the things themselves. If the images are powerful and pervasive, they can act on the things they supposedly represent by transforming them to make them conform to the prevalent images of those
things. Victims of violence are especially susceptible to this process.
Rendered passive and subdued by violence, they are represented as
somehow deserving of violence, as wanting or needing it. An effect of
violence, a particular representation, thus comes to justify violence. The
representations produced by acts of violence come to be justifications
for further acts of violence. That violence then furthers the transformation of its victims into people whose behavior conforms with the dominant representations of them. They become the passive, undeserving
things they were represented as being. Similarly, those rendered poor
by an economic system find comfort in excesses of self-indulgence-drug use particularly-that allow them to be pictured in images
that justify their being rendered poor. They are too irresponsible to deserve better. The result of immiseration-a certain fallen self-image
that gives rise to a public representation as undeserving-comes to occupy the position of a justifying cause.
The postmodernist revolution has drawn attention to the role of
representation in the construction of things we until now have assumed
to be pre- or extra-representational. As the prerevolutionary story went,
there was a world to be known, and we knew it using the representational and interpretive instruments at our disposal. Words stood for
things; narratives recounted our lives and histories; pictures gave us accurate images of our various worlds. All we had to do was find the right
representations and our thoughts and all the truths that were to be
known through them would stand before us in their simplicity and objectivity, untainted by the instruments that seemed nonetheless so nec-
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essary to their existence.
It is no longer as easy to believe this story. The variability of representation has drawn our attention to the way in which even supposedly
normal forms of social knowledge depend on representations. The tendency of representation to substitute for its cause has made us suspicious of claims to pre- or extra-representational truth; the active power
of representation has underscored the way we actively paint a world
into being out of the images we hold of it, images that are as much
projections of desire as depictions of real things.
Consider the example of the American nation state. American history books have attributed an almost natural coherence and linearity to
that particular set of rather contingent historical conventions through
narratives that posit an origin or cause from which a -plausible development-geographic, political, or economic-can be said to derive. From
Huck Finn to Gary Cooper, novels and films have constructed an image
of the American character, the privileged subject of the national narrative, as one endowed with the traits of self-reliant virtue and wise innocence. Such themes as "the struggle for liberty" have given the
psychological imperatives of this subject-white, male, heterosexual-semantic weight. One result is the exclusion of large segments of
the population from participation in the privileged subject's unfolding
history as anything other than minor characters and bit players. These
cultural exclusions always seem to imply political exclusions. If certain
experiences would be more valuable than others, certain points of view
more privileged, then certain social subjects would be more valuable
and privileged, too. The allocation of cultural meanings thus always
seems to be secured by strict semantic rules that are also political rules.
The purpose of the representational attribution of a sense of coherence to a fragmented social world is always to justify the conversion of
antagonistic parts into a unified whole. Representations justify the violence that is required if dissonant particularities are to become consonant totalities and if one part especially is to assume power over the
whole. Within the logic created by positing a coherent national community where only fragmented and asymmetrical class, gender, and racial
groups exist, the violence done to maintain the hierarchies of power
within the so-called nation will, as a result of the attribution of identity
through cultural representation, seem a reasonable action required to
preserve the integrity of the whole itself. Yet it is the very action of
subsumption of part to whole that constitutes the larger unity in the
first place. If workers turned out of factories become homeless or if infant mortality among blacks rises, it will seem a consequence of a logic
whose larger form is the very idea of a nation held together by rules
everyone must obey if the nation is to exist at all. The great trick of
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American liberalism is to call these rules the rules of freedom, which
makes them seem like no rules at all.
One important purpose of the representational positing of a national community is to neutralize the potentially destructive possibilities of social and historical contingency. If the rules of the national
community were not grounded in authoritative meanings given by the
dominant interpretations and regimes of signification, then the violence
done in the name of those rules and meanings would not seem justified
and might result in counter violence. By creating a sense of coherence
and unity, representations secure a sense of authority that is as much
political as cultural. In this process certain representations and meanings come to occupy a foundational and grounding position in the logic
of signification that defines the national community. Other meanings
that represent both alternative interpretations of a particular social reality and alternative ways of structuring that reality come to be either
marginalized or repressed.
Freedom is perhaps the most important of these grounding representations in the American context. As a representation, freedom gains
authority for itself from the founding narrative of the struggle against
monarchial absolutism. The representational construction of America
would be based on certain images of male action and economic possibility, a merchant class's utopia of desire restrained only by the measure
of harm done to other merchants. Having been endowed with a power
of its own from these founding images, freedom became an agent of
action in its own right, legitimating violence against those who fell
outside the boundary of the merchant utopia as well as against practitioners of alternative ideals of a more communal society. The represeritation continues to saturate our political culture, empowering particular
subjects and preventing those public institutions that represent interests not served by the ideology of economic freedom from playing too
intrusive a role and acting as a restraint. The selective service done by
this concept-that in an economic free-for-all only some win and many
lose-stages a situation in which the representation sanctions the legitimate violence of dispossession. Particularly for those consigned to labor, the representation has little relevance other than as the name for
the actions they are permitted during time off from the prison of exploitation. Freedom has thus become more evidently what it has always
been from the outset-the right to violate.
The men who invented the concept of freedom and whose self-representations are embodied in the contours of possible actions licensed
by freedom would not quite agree, of course. Their struggle with their
fathers in an authoritarian patriarchal culture (John Stuart Mill being
the exemplar) made liberty both a valuable and a useful concept, one
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that secured needed latitude but retained a vertical ordering of social
groups. In a world without the old paternalist forms of political authority, these firm semantic grounds were needed. Alternatives were always
available, of course, if only because alternative social subjectivities existed, from women to workers to slaves. The alternative possibilities of
life that emerged from the repressed majority's experiences of exclusion
from the white male world of axiomatized autonomy registered as much
in the realm of cultural representation as they did in the high rates of
repressive violence that always seem to be the male way of greeting infringements on autonomy.
If freedom, for example, has a positive meaning of unrestrained action whose limit is harm done to others of one's own gender, race, and
class, it also has the negative meaning of refusing to heighten the priority of social responsibility. That negative meaning is important because
it is not simply another possible meaning. It suggests another world picture entirely and is always inscribed as its repressed converse in the
actions licensed by the doctrine of freedom. The political ideal of freedom of choice presupposes an already disintegrated social world in
which contending factions relate to each other as externalities that
merely signify other more important material differences of power.
Choice of parties bears within it the negative meaning of the refusal of
an ideal of a social community that can negotiate its differences because
those differences are truly political. In other words, they are not representative of any significant material differences of station or power, but
rather are differences of opinion regarding the shape of a world to
which all are bound equally because all participate and hold shares
equally. The economic ideal of freedom harbors a similarly repressed
alternative meaning that signifies an alternative world construction.
The principle of free economic action means also a refusal of a possible
world in which agents need not face each other as dissociated antagonists. The meaning of freedom as dissociation and opposition derives
from an implied background meaning that is its converse: the ideal of a
world of conjugated association without opposition.
The meanings I am describing are possible, but necessarily repressed. They must be repressed because their availability suggests the
radical contingency of a social universe whose supposed ontological stability is confirmed by the stability and univocality of its representations. That contingency is contained by the positioning of terms like
freedom as foundational meanings within a particular regime of signification. Differences of meaning, which are differences of possible world
constructions, thus come to be differences over the interpretation of a
set of terms whose status as founding terms cannot be challenged. Liberalism's great success was not that it substituted the rationality of law
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for the violence of feudal authority, but rather the discovery that semantic repression works just as well as physical force.
Only in recent decades have we come to think twice about the
power of this representational system. People who have been violated
by the cultural representations that subsumed their experience and by
the system of political representation that obliterated their voices have
begun to demand representation of their own-native Americans whose
land was stolen, women whose existence as subjects was denied, and
blacks whose lives were shattered-all for the sake of wise innocence.
What emerges after this questioning is a sense of an entirely different
world that demands new representations which do justice to the broken
lives that are the legacy of America's emergence as a nation. If power
spoke in a narrative without shadows, according to a line of development at once straight and self-sufficient that moved toward goals of
freedom of action and antisocial self-empowerment, which were particularly satisfactory ideals for the white, heterosexual male subject of the
narrative, then the questioning of power would necessarily challenge the
monovocality of that history. If the violated were to speak, then there
would be many voices, not one. If power was by definition the disempowerment of others and their submission to the experience of selfdissociation, then counter power would not speak in the mode of empowered subjectivity, confident of its project, secure in its unviolated
source, and destined toward its inevitable goal. Stories of counter power
would require a sense of the tentativeness of other perspectives, of history as a frequently violent field of contingencies, of narrative itself as a
fragile and constant exercise in self-construction.
III.

FOR CONSTITUENCY DEMOCRACY

If counter power would require a different system of cultural representation that would not subsume dissonant lives to a single term like
freedom, it would also, I will now argue, require a different system of
political representation that would not subsume the whole community
to one of its parts. There are strong links between the representational
structures that shape the ideological realities and imaginative possibilities of American culture and the actual structures of political representation which hold that culture and that society in place. My attempt to
chart this course is fraught with danger; it is the kind of thing that can
earn you a bad reputation, especially in the political culture of the
American left, which is devoted to the idea that real things are real
things and that there is a clear line between real things and imaginary
ones. Even though it can easily be demonstrated that all the ideas, beliefs, and assumptions that people bring to social interaction come from
culture, from the representations, narratives, and images that form our
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psychologies, still one must be careful. And for good reason: in society
and in reality, violence is done; though it may be done in the name of
certain representations, still, real hands do the harm. Or can we make
so clear a distinction, even in this realm?
I recently saw a Soviet documentary about a young man who murdered two people. He was robbing them with a gun in his hand, and
when the woman laughed at him and ran to the door, he shot her. In
trying to explain his feelings at that moment, he said she made him feel
small by not taking him seriously, even though he did not really want to
be taken seriously as a killer because he had never harmed anyone
before. He was overwhelmed by shame and anger, by a self-image that
fell short of what he liked to think of himself as being. Later in the
film, one learns that his mother, a rather tough-minded person,
shunned him and left the family. A recurring image of this abandonment no doubt influenced his psychological disposition when confronted
with his female victim's derision. The young man did indeed do the
killing, but there is something else about this situation that requires
attention. It underscores the difference between the criminalization of
people and the description of those actual, empirical, and very real
processes of representation and self-representation that go into the production of violence. The young man killed in part because of a particular representation of himself that emerged in the interaction with his
female victim. That representation was deadly for his self-image and
contributed to his willingness to commit violence. And violence must
always be interpreted, I think, as the physical projection of psychological fantasies. At the origin of much male domestic violence is a problem
of self-representation, of a certain dangerous vulnerability of self-imaging. The silencing of that violence, its acceptance through particular
strategies of interpretation by victimized women, often has to do with
the need to represent the world in a particular way, as a place where
violence must somehow be justified, where it is necessary or logical
rather than contingent and random.
This framework should tell us something about why authoritative
representations in general, which posit a ground of necessity behind
contingent institutions like the nation state or the capitalist market, are
necessary precisely in societies constructed around these institutions.
As they are formulated on the principles of aggression and defensiveness, those institutions promote the kind of violent instability that results in a need for a sense of justice, a sense that the threat of violence
which is the basis of enforced community in a society founded on the
free right to violate is somehow part of a necessary order, some system
of meaning that makes the violence seem rational. The greater the
levels of unjust violence in a society, one might say, the greater the like-
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lihood of encountering representations of the just necessity of violence.
What we learn in studying the just world syndrome in domestic or
intimate violence, therefore, can help us account for how a representational process allows large sectors of our population to accept violent
subordination. The process is akin to euphemism, and it operates
through a substitution that annuls one reality in favor of an image that
bears a significant nonrelationship to that reality. I say nonrelationship
because the reality itself is one that withstands semantic ordering. It
seems to have no meaning; it offers no consolation. The Soviet man's
confusion of representation at the moment of violence, the nonalignment between the woman's derisive representation of him and his own
desired self-image (derived in part no doubt from the image his departing mother left with him) was solved by a representation of himself as
capable of violence-indeed, by a representation of himself as a perpetrator of a violence that annulled a negative and threatening representation of himself. The desire on the part of violated women to make
some sense of a violent social world executes a similar substitution. The
contingency and apparent randomness of the violent event is effaced
and subsumed to a meaning that substitutes a sense of order for what
appears to be without logic or reason.
Representation is, therefore, very much a part of the world, and I
will now argue that one can relate the operations of cultural and psychological representation to the system of political representation in a
republican democracy such as that of the United States. Our political
system imposes a structure of meaning on a potentially random and
contingent social world. Meaning provides order, and order is achieved
through substitution. As in cultural and psychological representation,
the semantic order imposed bears a significant nonrelationship to the
world represented. In political representation, as in much cultural representation, the structure of substitution is one in which a privileged
representation does not relate to the social whole in crucial ways; it
must not so relate in order to effectively subsume the contingency and
diversity of that world to a manageable scheme of order (as well as an
orderly scheme of management).
If social violence always involves the exclusion of others from
power, or resources, or rights, the representations that enable such violence are themselves exclusionary. They lie or misrepresent by allowing
one group's representations of the world to become the standard for
constructing that world. What is striking about ideals like freedom is
how little they actually represent of the reality they supposedly name.
The managerial executive class of white male businessmen may be relatively free, but those whose exploitation lies at the origin of their
wealth-the large throngs of people, many of whom are female or non-
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white, who put in hours each day, year after year, producing and doing
things for those men-certainly are not. It might be more accurate to
name this reality with a mixture of representations: free domination, for
example, or more elaborately, majority coerced labor-minority communally subsidized liberty. These do not sound as nice as freedom,
however, and I wonder sometimes if we cherish certain cultural and political ideals precisely because they offer the image of a compensatory
utopia of unrestrained action that has very little to do with the debased
reality they supposedly depict. One thing at least is certain: These representations allow a part of reality to stand in for the whole. They permit one group's self-defining ideal to substitute for what might be the
real interests of the majority, thereby displacing those interests and removing them from view as well as from the realm of legitimate public
discussion.
If we can say that one problem with the representations that construct things such as the idea of a nation state is their inaccuracy, the
same is true of the system of political representation. The current political system aids the violence of exclusion precisely because it is not representative enough. The system lies, if you will. Although the authority
and legitimacy that systems of political representation claim for themselves rest on a notion of fair and equal representation, wealthy white
males bear at best a metonymic relationship to the social whole. The
basic process of political representation, like that of cultural representation, is one of substitution and displacement. Members of the upper
sectors of society, mostly male and mostly white, acting as political representatives, stand in for and supposedly represent the interests of everyone else. It is a matter of substituting part for whole again, and
again one would have to say that the result is a displacement and repression of the real interests of the larger group.
I say this with trepidation because one can easily claim, of course,
that if people wanted something other than what they get, they could
make those demands felt. It is here precisely that one begins to perceive
the contact between cultural representation-understood as a system
for reinforcing the conventions essential to the maintenance of the
founding economic, political, and social structures of power in a society-and political representation. When the only permissible representations around are ones like freedom that make the whole game seem
somehow legitimate and that make alternative formulations like wealth
redistribution or economic democracy seem abridgements of everything
the nation stands for, then it is unlikely that people will be able to
express their needs in anything but the terms endorsed as legitimate by
the existing system of power. What gets represented in political representation, if you will, is cultural representation. If the system of politi-
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cal representation is meant to translate or communicate the needs,
interests, and desires of the population into policies and programs, then
the difficulty in thinking about those feelings in anything but licensed
representations illustrates something crucial about the kinds of limits
such political representation is likely to respect, even when it is operating most naturally and spontaneously, without any apparent manipulation. The process works in the other direction as well. When an
inaccurate system of political representation holds sway, the rise to
dominance of cultural representations that question the governing
power is unlikely.
This is why, when societies change in radical ways as in Eastern
Europe, everything changes, from the words and images that circulate
in culture to the political and economic institutions. And this also is
why, when societies like America do not change radically, nothing
changes. The culture continues to circulate the same self-serving ideology, and the process of exploitation that fuels the enormous private accumulation of a community's wealth remains the same. Dominant
representations of reality turn out to be dominant predictors of reality.
But what if things were to change? What would it look like? Let us
assume that the process of displacement and substitution which allows
one partial perspective to stand in for the whole is not such a good idea,
either culturally or politically. Everyone should have a direct say in
what happens. Politically, that will require a different kind of representational system. Culturally, it implies the full democratization of cultural production, a full inclusion or representation of voices in what is
now a minority affair. The second depends, I would argue, on the first.
A great deal of attention has been given to the issue of cultural democracy, but we have simply assumed the rationality of our current system
of political representation. How might it be reformulated?
One possible answer might be called constituency democracy. It
would be a system of more accurate representation based on the assumption that the different interests of constituencies are best represented when they are represented directly by those constituencies. This
means that the ideology of totality in political representation, the assumption that a part can stand in for the whole, would be put aside.
White, well-to-do men would no longer represent black, not-so-well-todo women. In place of this system would be a more fragmented and
multiple process that would favor no single part by allowing it to stand
in for and displace all the others. More concretely, all social groups with
a significant membership, a significant relationship of subordination to
hitherto dominant groups, or a significant history of exclusion from representation and power-women, sexual and ethnic minorities, and the
various unrepresented lower income groups-would be proportionately
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represented in the political "decision-making bodies of the nation. If half
of the country is female, then half of the representative decision-making body either should be female or chosen exclusively by women. If
one-third of the population is black or gay, the same would be true of
them. If two-thirds of the nation makes less than 75,000 dollars a year,
then two-thirds of the representatives also would make less than 75,000
dollars a year.
Obvious problems would arise in this kind of system. Should one
category such as income prevail over another such as gender, for example? Are Irish Americans a significantly oppressed and excluded group?
All these questions require thought, negotiation, and the development
of tests and standards. I would argue for proportional demographic representation for at least those groups that recent history has taught us
have been victims of violence and exclusion-nonwhite racial minorities, women, lower income people, and victims of ethnic violence and
prejudice based on sexual preference. But clearly, any such system
would have to be extremely flexible-open in an absolute way to change
and revision.
Nothing like this will ever take place, of course, as long as power
exists. Power in a pseudo-democratic situation depends on the substitution of one group's interests for another's and on the cultural representation of this process as the fulfillment of a political ideal like freedom.
What is interesting to imagine, nevertheless, is how large a difference a
small thing like a change in representation might make. What would
blacks, or working people, or women, or sexual minorities do if they
were represented in Congress according to their numbers? Perhaps fear
of the answer to that question keeps us where we are, with the forms of
political representation that we now possess.
IV. REPRESENTATION AS AN ANTIDOTE TO VIOLENCE

I want to conclude with one final justification for the kind of political representation I have just described as constituency democracy. It
would help bring an end to violence by according a power of speech, of
self-representation, to those whose victimization depends in part on
their banishment from the realm of public representation, or on their
positioning within that realm as objects rather than expressive subjects.
Violence depends on a particular kind of representation of the victims
of violence, one that is not informed by the victims themselves. Like
the substitutional rhetoric of political representation under republican
liberalism, the representations that enable and encourage violent victimization abolish others by substituting a partial projection for the
whole picture of another person or people. Violence spreads through a
process of representation, simulation, and copying. The violence of sub-
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jugation and frustration in the economic realm, for example, becomes a
repetition and reenactment of that same violence in a more controllable
domestic arena. Past violence is reenacted when victims are turned into
perpetrators whose beings as potentially independent subjects are foreclosed by the images of past harm they bear with them. The public
ethic of violation in a nation state that prides itself on its ability to beat
up on smaller, dark-skinned neighbors is copied in a circulation of more
private forms of violence. The violence of a society founded on the free
right to violate returns to society in the violence perpetrated by its victims against themselves and others.
If representation lies close to the heart of social violence, representation of another kind enables its solution, its exorcism, so to speak.
The bringing of repressed material to conscious representation is the
secret of psychotherapy's quelling of private violence. With the entry
into social speech of the voices of those repressed others who are the
objects of society's violence, public violence finally begins to find its
limit. We cannot hurt those who speak to us and to whom we speak; to
allow speech is to accord power and existence as a subject, to grant a
right of representation both culturally and politically. In the power of
this subjectivity is entailed an inevitable process of recognition, the representation of the other as like oneself. At a certain point, the end of
violence is the inability to harm oneself. Crucial in this endeavor is the
creation of pathways that permit more equal forms of representation,
forms that do not displace or substitute and thereby annul perspectives.
We will need a different kind of political democracy to accommodate
this need-new, more accurate forms of political representation. Only
then, I think, will American culture be capable of achieving the kind of
community it now can only pretend to be.
AFTERWORD

I have cheated by including in my Preface a response to my respondent, Professor Robert Covington. I want to elaborate a bit more here
on some other possible responses to Professor Covington and to others
from the audience who offered challenging and helpful comments.
It would be inaccurate, as Professor Covington rightly points out,
to characterize the American tradition as being without exception violent toward nondominant racial and sexual grodps. The violated have
had their sympathizers in the ruling group, and some of these proponents wrote novels and made movies. Even as zealous a perpetrator of
representational violence against Native Americans as John Ford would
make films like Cheyenne Autumn late in his career, which portray
quite sympathetically the hazards of being nonwhite in nineteenth century America. I would suggest, however, that we should not confuse ex-
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ceptions with rules. Indeed, the exceptions must be understood as
arising out of and in response to the overwhelming preponderance of
the rules.
I have treated Professor Covington's other point-that too much
change risks provoking a right-wing reaction-with perhaps too much
irony in my prefatory anecdote. This is a liberal version of the conservative slippery slope argument that a little equality can lead quickly
to too much equality (whatever that is). In my oral response at the
Symposium, I suggested that the fragmentation Professor Covington
fears is already upon us, and it assumes the shape of the very harmony
he thinks is so worthy of preservation. If one is a white male and
thereby a member of the favored group, then the current unequal system of power and resource distribution, with all of its attendant acts of
repressive violence on the part of the legal system against less favored
groups, might indeed seem a praiseworthy harmony that should be preserved. But if one belongs to one of the fragments that is an object of
legal violence and of subsumption to the white, male-dominated
whole-if one is gay, or black, or female, or poor-then such harmony
will seem less virtuous. As always, where we stand determines what we
see.
Someone in the audience wondered if some of the subjectivities I
described as needing representation may be created by society. I think
the point here was that the categories I used may not have any ontological grounding outside social construction. Are gays or women or
blacks separable categories, or are all these groupings merely conventions applied to much more complicated, differentially constituted, nonidentical subjective processes? I think that is true in reality, but again
we must take into account the dominant representations that allow certain groups of people to be fit into those categories and treated in certain ways as a result. Those representational acts of categorization are
also real, and because they are the categories of existing power, they are
the ones we must contend with in seeking to defuse this power.
Cornel West wondered if substantive issues of wealth distribution
and the like might not be more important than the alternative forms of
political representation that I proposed. I suggested then, and suggest
again now, that the alternative form of representation would be more
likely to guarantee that those issues would actually be raised in a legislative assembly than would the current form of representation. Now, for
example, the concerns of lower income people are not addressed as
structural problems by political representatives. If those people were
represented according to their numbers, such avoidance would be less
likely.

